Unionization and Shareholder Interests

Datos Bibliográficos

ID3317028
AutoresBrian E Becker (0000-0001-5607-3418), Craig A Olson
Año1989
Volumen42
Número2
Páginas246-261
Fecha de publicación1989-01-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaIndustrial and Labor Relations Review (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0019-7939 • E-ISSN: 2162-271X
EditorialSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/001979398904200206
OpenAlexW1985231252
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas8
Referencias citadas20

Drawing on agency theory, this study examines union-nonunion differences in the allocation of both firm profits and business risk to employees and shareholders. Using a sample of more than 1,000 large private sector firms, the authors find that over the period 1970-81 shareholders in unionized firms assumed less of the firm's business risk than shareholders in nonunion firms. This finding is interpreted as evidence that managers of unionized firms attempted to minimize agency costs by capitalizing on the incentive effects of risksharing. In addition, risk-adjusted returns to shareholders were lower in unionized firms than in nonunion firms. The authors view the relatively poor performance of union firms as a primary motivating factor behind the restructuring of the American industrial relations system during the period studied

Agency (philosophy) · Agency cost · Business · Business risks · Corporate governance · Economics · Incentive · Labour economics · Law and economics · Market economy · Restructuring · Sample (material) · Shareholder · Accounting · Corporate Finance and Governance · Corporate Governance and Law · Finance · Labor Movements and Unions · Transport and Economic Policies