Is Talk Really Cheap? Prompting Conversation between Critical Theory and Rational Choice

Datos Bibliográficos

ID3365448
AutoresJames Johnson (0000-0001-7109-4575), James Turner Johnson (0000-0003-3555-169X, University of Rochester, autor de correspondencia)
Año1993
Volumen87
Número1
Páginas74-86
Fecha de publicación1993-03-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaAmerican Political Science Review (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0003-0554 • E-ISSN: 1537-5943
EditorialCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/2938957
OpenAlexW2116451536
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas59
Referencias citadas40

Critical theory and rational choice theory share both overlapping concerns and parallel theoretical weaknesses. Specifically, both critical theorists and rational choice theorists are preoccupied with determining whatrationalcan mean in the realm of social and political interaction. I show in a provisional way how game theory extends and deepens the critical theorists' basic intuition that unembellished strategic rationality cannot adequately sustain social and political interaction. And I suggest how critical theory identifies a mechanism underlying the force of the "cheap talk" that game theorists introduce in hopes of circumscribing the indeterminacy generated by their models. My goal is to stimulate productive conversation between what are typically considered discordant research traditions

Conversation · Economics · Epistemology · Game theory · Indeterminacy (philosophy · Intuition · Mathematical economics · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Rationality · Realm · Sociology · Economic Theory and Institutions · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics