The Limits of Consensual Decision
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 3373201 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Douglas W Rae (Yale University, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 1975 |
| Volumen | 69 |
| Número | 4 |
| Páginas | 1270-1294 |
| Fecha de publicación | 1975-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | American Political Science Review (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0003-0554 • E-ISSN: 1537-5943 |
| Editorial | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/1955287 |
| OpenAlex | W2114709930 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 52 |
| Referencias citadas | 29 |
This essay criticizes the ideal of consensual decision as it appears in liberal political theory. A historical survey begins with Locke's view of consent, its criticism and extension by 19th century figures such as Godwin, Calhoun, and Mill, its reappearance in the guise of economic efficiency within the works of Wicksell or Buchanan and Tullock and as moral autonomy in Wolff'sDefense of Anarchy. The paper offers a structural account of political decision making in which vulnerability to the authority of others seems inescapable and in which neither unanimity nor a universal right of consent is possible. On this telling, consensual decision is logically unattainable and misdirects constitutional theory
Autonomy · Criticism · Economics · Epistemology · Extension (predicate logic · Ideal (ethics · Law and economics · Mill · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Sociology · Unanimity · Computer Science · Free Will and Agency · History · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics
Contractarian theory, deliberative democracy and general agreement
Democratic Deliberation Within
Drift and conversion
Democracy and the Limits of Self-Government
Reflective Democracy
The common good
Justice and Democracy
Justice, democracy and public goods
James Buchanan, Gordon Tullock, and the “Radically Irresponsible” One Person, One Vote Decisions
Abstraction as flexibility
Each counts for one
Taking the Goals of Deliberation Seriously
Intuitions about the epistemic virtues of majority voting
Democracy vs. Efficiency
In search of optimum ?relative unanimity
Organized Interests and the Prospects of a Global Democracy
The unanimity rule and religious fractionalisation in the Polish-Lithuanian Republic
The Status Quo in Contractarian-Constitutionalist Perspective
Resolve, Accept, or Avoid
Rights, Equality, and the Ethics of School Policy
Voting games and constitutional decision
An Altimeter for Mr. Escher's Stairway
Exchange, unanimity and consent
The Calculus of Consent
Optimal voting rules under uncertainty
In search of optimum ?relative unanimity
The calculus of piratical consent
In search of optimum ?relative unanimity
The importance of uncertainty in a two-stage theory of constitutions
Efficient allocation and unanimous consent with incomplete demand disclosures
Democracy, dictatorship and decision costs
The necessity of “corporatism”
Supply‐side politics
The New Authoritarianism in Public Choice
Deliberation and disagreement
Designing Constitutions
The Norm of Consensus on the U.S. Supreme Court
Against Impartiality
A short history of studying incremental institutional change
Motivational Orientation and the Nature of Consensual Decision Processes
After the “Master Theory
What Is Political Science For
The Tyranny of the Supermajority
On the Geometry of Unanimity Rule
Deliberation and Decision in Collaborative Governance
Democracy without democracy? Can the EU's democratic ‘outputs’ be separated from the democratic ‘inputs’ provided by competitive parties and majority rule
Polecats, lions, and foxes
Special Majorities Rationalized
Institutionalizing the Public Interest
Missing the Archimedean Point
Privatizing Risk without Privatizing the Welfare State
The arbitrariness of supermajority rules
Politics, economics, and welfare
A Critique of Welfare Economics
The records of the Federal Convention of 1787
The ideological origins of the American Revolution.
On Law in Economy and Society
Classics in the Theory of Public Finance
A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
Structure of Social Action
The Calculus of Consent
A Theory of Justice
A Preface to Democratic Theory, Expanded Edition
The Logic of Collective Action
An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice
In Defense of Anarchism
A Parable
Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility
Some Ways of Thinking about Equality
Some Ambiguities in the Concept of Intensity
The "Intensity" Problem and Democratic Theory
Bargaining in a Three-Person Game
Political Money
Political Democracy as a Property of Political Institutions
John Locke and the Doctrine of Majority-Rule
| Obras citantes distintas | 52 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 1,13 |
| Intervalo de citas | 1980 - 2026 (47) |
| Velocidad de citación | current |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 52 |