Mutual Recognition and Rational Justification in Hegel'sPhenomenology of Spirit

Datos Bibliográficos

ID3890002
AutoresKenneth R Westphal (0000-0001-6039-760X, University of Kent, autor de correspondencia)
Año2009
Volumen48
Número4
Páginas753-799
Fecha de publicación2009-12-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaDialogue (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949
EditorialCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0012217309990412
OpenAlexW2131012668
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas6
Referencias citadas70

Individual rational judgment, of the kind required for justification in cognition or morals, is fundamentally socially and historically conditioned. I argue for this by defending key themes from Kant's and Hegel's accounts of rational judgment and justification, including the "autonomy" of rational judgment and one key point of Hegel's account of "mutual recognition." These themes are rooted in Kant's and Hegel's transformation of the modern natural law tradition, which originates the properly pragmatic account of rationality, which affords genuine rational justification, and which provides for realism about the objects of empirical knowledge and strict objectivity about moral norms

Autonomy · Epistemology · Hegelianism · Moral psychology · Moral realism · Objectivity (philosophy) · Phenomenology (philosophy) · Political science · Practical reason · Rationality · Realism · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Seventeenth-Century Political and Philosophical Thought · War, Ethics, and Justification