Spoilers of peace
Pro-government militias as risk factors for conflict recurrence
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 3916172 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Christoph V Steinert (0000-0003-1760-3214, University of Oxford, autor de correspondencia), Janina Isabel Steinert (0000-0001-7120-0075, University of Oxford), Sonia C Carey (0000-0003-3286-0040, University of Mannheim) |
| Año | 2019 |
| Volumen | 56 |
| Número | 2 |
| Páginas | 249-263 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2019-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Journal of Peace Research (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0022-3433 • E-ISSN: 1460-3578 |
| Editorial | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022343318800524 |
| OpenAlex | W2898493740 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 26 |
| Referencias citadas | 61 |
This study investigates how deployment of pro-government militias (PGMs) as counterinsurgents affects the risk of conflict recurrence. Militiamen derive material and non-material benefits from fighting in armed conflicts. Since these will likely have diminished after the conflict's termination, militiamen develop a strong incentive to spoil post-conflict peace. Members of pro-government militias are particularly disadvantaged in post-conflict contexts compared to their role in the government's counterinsurgency campaign. First, PGMs are usually not present in peace negotiations between rebels and governments. This reduces their commitment to peace agreements. Second, disarmament and reintegration programs tend to exclude PGMs, which lowers their expected and real benefits from peace. Third, PGMs might lose their advantage of pursuing personal interests while being protected by the government, as they become less essential during peacetimes. To empirically test whether conflicts with PGMs as counterinsurgents are more likely to break out again, we identify PGM counterinsurgent activities in conflict episodes between 1981 and 2007. We code whether the same PGM was active in a subsequent conflict between the same actors. Controlling for conflict types, which is associated with both the likelihood of deploying PGMs and the risk of conflict recurrence, we investigate our claims with propensity score matching, statistical simulation, and logistic regression models. The results support our expectation that conflicts in which pro-government militias were used as counterinsurgents are more likely to recur. Our study contributes to an improved understanding of the long-term consequences of employing PGMs as counterinsurgents and highlights the importance of considering non-state actors when crafting peace and evaluating the risk of renewed violence
Conflict avoidance · Conflict resolution · Conflict resolution research · Disadvantaged · Disarmament · Economics · Government (linguistics) · Incentive · Negotiation · Political science · Law · Peacebuilding and International Security · Political Conflict and Governance · Politics and Conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Middle East · Psychology · Social Psychology
From Control to Conflict
Conceptualizing Civil War Complexity
Governance Interrupted
Introduction – Peacebuilding Amidst Violence
Disarmament on Whose Terms? Rethinking Armed Group Control in the Philippines
Delegating repression
How pro-government militia ethnic relationships influence violence against civilians
Post-Conflict Regimes and the Survival of Pro-Government Militias
Negotiating Peace with Pro-Government Militias
The legacy of war
How exposure to wartime violence shapes conflict resolution preferences
Local competitive authoritarianism and post-conflict violence. An analysis of the assassination of social leaders in Colombia
Peace Processes and the Integration of Pro-Government Militias
Armed group proliferation and conflict dynamics
Bias and balance in civil war mediation
Spoiling the Broth? The Impact of Militia Violence on Peace Negotiations
Does Withdrawal of Troops After Military Intervention Reduce Rebel Groups
Civilian militia formation and protection against rebel violence
Security Consolidation in the Aftermath of Civil War
The Ties That Bind
What They Are Fighting For – Introducing the UCDP Conflict Issues Dataset
Battles and Bargains
The Puzzle of Militia Containment in Civil War
The Political Effects of Witnessing State Atrocities
The credible commitment problem and multiple armed groups
Potential tensions and synergies between DDR and transitional justice in relation to pro-government militias
Reintegrating Armed Groups After Conflict
Agents of Atrocity
Applied Logistic Regression
A Practitioner’s Guide to Cluster-Robust Inference
From Max Weber
States, the security sector, and the monopoly of violence
Ending Civil Wars
Violence in Post-Conflict Societies
Militias and the challenges of post-conflict peace
Contemporary Peace Making
Greed and grievance in civil war
The Consequences of Child Soldiering
The Enemy of My Enemy is My Friend … The Dynamics of Self-Defense Forces in Irregular War
The legacies of war economies
Anatomy of a surrogate
The Impact of Pro-Government Militias on Human Rights Violations
Sustaining the Peace
Monitoring Trends in Global Combat
Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars
The Perils of Profiling
Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes
Looting in the context of violent conflict
The Futility of Force? Strategic Lessons for Dealing with Unconventional Armed Groups from the UN’s War on Haiti’s Gangs
Light Weapons and Civil Conflict
Democracy under the Gun Understanding Postconflict Economic Recovery
Tracking the “Arab Spring
Militias in Civil Wars
Why Bad Governance Leads to Repeat Civil War
Does Warfare Matter? Severity, Duration, and Outcomes of Civil Wars
Governance and Conflict Relapse
Governments, Informal Links to Militias, and Accountability
Looting and Conflict between Ethnoregional Groups
It Takes Two
How Civil Wars End
Demobilization and Reintegration
Militias, Ideology, and the State
Risk Mitigation, Regime Security, and Militias
Rage Against the Machines
Veto Players and Civil War Duration
Who Fights? The Determinants of Participation in Civil War
Making the Most of Statistical Analyses
Bureaucratic façade and political realities of disarmament and demobilisation in Afghanistan
Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War
Enemies with benefits? Violent rivalry and terrorist group longevity
Partial Peace
The Aftermath of Civil War
Organized violence, 1989-2017
The spoils of nature
Does Conflict Beget Conflict? Explaining Recurring Civil War
Ethnic Politics and Armed Conflict
How and when armed conflicts end
Violence Against Civilians in Civil Wars
Armed Conflict 1946-2001
Armed conflict and post-conflict justice, 1946-2006
International System and Technologies of Rebellion
Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816-1992
The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993
Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War
| Obras citantes distintas | 26 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 4,33 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2020 - 2026 (7) |
| Velocidad de citación | current |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 24 |