Pure Coercion vs. Carrot-and-Stick Offers in Crisis Bargaining
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 3916971 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Steven Greffeniu, Steven Greffenius (The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies and the Hopkins-Nanjing Center for Chinese and American Studies, Nanjing, China), Jungil Gill (Department of Political Science, University of Wisconsin) |
| Año | 1992 |
| Volumen | 29 |
| Número | 1 |
| Páginas | 39-52 |
| Fecha de publicación | 1992-02-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Journal of Peace Research (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0022-3433 • E-ISSN: 1460-3578 |
| Editorial | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022343392029001004 |
| OpenAlex | W2008846015 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 9 |
| Referencias citadas | 15 |
In the crisis preceding the Gulf war, the United States favored pure coercion over carrot-and-stick offers. This article, which replicates and extends research reported by Leng (1984), supports the hypothesis that carrot-and-stick offers work better than pure coercion if an actor has already demonstrated resolve. Beginning with Jervis's (1976) distinction between deterrence and spiral theories of interaction, the article assesses the effects of various types of forceful moves in crisis bargaining. Interrupted time-series techniques are used with data on hostility levels in two confrontations to test the hypothesis that pure coercion tends to elicit a response in kind, whereas carrot-and-stick offers tend to elicit accommodation. Analysis of Behavioral Correlates of War data on actors' responses in the Cuban missile crisis and in the Egyptian-Israeli confrontation in 1967 corroborate Leng's original findings. Iraq's responses to the USA's threats in the Gulf conflict suggest that pure coercion can induce an opponent to fight even when it is weaker
Adversary · Coercion (linguistics) · Computer security · Criminology · Eavesdropping · Hostility · Political science · Terrorism · Computer Science · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Law · Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology
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Force and Influence in International Crises
To punish or to reward? The effect of sanction threats on public opinion
Power, vulnerability, and Zinnes's interaction puzzle
Modeling threats and promises
Reinterpreting western use of coercion in Bosnia‐Herzegovina
Time series analysis
Psychology and Deterrence
Time Series Analysis
Intervention Analysis with Applications to Economic and Environmental Problems
New directions in the study of foreign policy
Conflict Among Nations
Perception and Misperception in International Politics
Fights, Games, and Debates
Deterrence
Testing Deterrence Theory
What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to 1980
Militarized Interstate Crises
Dangerous Disputes
Reagan and the Russians
| Obras citantes distintas | 9 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 0,26 |
| Intervalo de citas | 1992 - 2025 (34) |
| Velocidad de citación | recent |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 8 |