The Balance of Power
Formal Perfection and Practical Flaws
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 3917397 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Horowitz (0000-0001-5953-0987, University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee, autor de correspondencia), Shale Horowitz (University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee) |
| Año | 2001 |
| Volumen | 38 |
| Número | 6 |
| Páginas | 705-722 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2001-11-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Journal of Peace Research (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0022-3433 • E-ISSN: 1460-3578 |
| Editorial | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022343301038006004 |
| OpenAlex | W2095775610 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 1 |
| Referencias citadas | 19 |
A game-theoretic model is used to show that the balance-of-power mechanism has much greater formal power than hitherto understood. Under the strong assumption that all threatened countries must be able to function as crucial coalition partners in deterring any threat, all members of minimum winning coalitions are guaranteed not to lose any resources. Under the traditional, weaker assumption that some coalition must be available to deter any threat, even countries that are not members of minimum winning coalitions are guaranteed against losing any resources. These formal results are significant in two ways. First, they make it possible to reconcile apparently contradictory views in the literature, and to offer a satisfying intuitive interpretation of the balance-of-power mechanism. Second, they point to a variety of factors - operating both separately and interactively - that may cause the balance-of-power mechanism to fail. Examples are uncertainty combined with risk-loving preferences, conflict-averse preferences, offensive technological advantages, economic growth, and technological and political rigidities in the formation of alliances and rivalries. It is argued that efforts to test balance-of-power theory should focus on assessing the relative importance of such factors
Balance (ability) · Business · Computer security · Economics · Epistemology · Function (biology) · Interpretation (philosophy) · Law and economics · Mechanism (biology) · Microeconomics · Offensive · Perfection · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Power (physics) · Production (economics) · Risk analysis (engineering) · Variety (cybernetics) · Computer Science · International Development and Aid · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Psychology
The Balance of Power
Peace and War
Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age
Power and International Relations
The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War
Utopia in Power
The Great Powers and the European States System, 1814-1914
The Theory of Games and the Balance of Power
Fighting Battles, Winning Wars
A Theory of the Balance of Power in International Systems
Rationalist explanations for war
Arms versus allies
Alliance Transitions and Great Power War
When Do Power Shifts Lead to War
The Paradox of Power
Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986
A New Concert of Powers
Guns, Butter, and Anarchy
Peace, War, and the Balance of Power
| Obras citantes distintas | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 0,06 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2009 - 2009 (1) |
| Velocidad de citación | historical |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 1 |