Sunk in the Sahara

The Applicability of the Sunk Cost Effect to Irredentist Disputes

Datos Bibliográficos

ID3978481
AutoresKarin Von Hippel (King's College Hospital, autor de correspondencia)
Año1996
Volumen1
Número1
Páginas95-116
Fecha de publicación1996-06-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Journal of North African Studies (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 1362-9387 • E-ISSN: 1743-9345
EditorialInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/13629389608718267
OpenAlexW2028771879
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas5
Referencias citadas17

The sunk cost effect describes the inability of decision makers to abandon chosen courses of action even when the costs outweigh the gains, potential or real. An examination of the background to the Western Sahara conflict suggests that Morocco has been victim to the sunk cost effect, even though the monarchy might not be able nor wish to abandon its policy after so many years' commitment. The Moroccan experience is contrasted with some other well‐known cases of the sunk cost effect in contemporary international relations and mechanisms are suggested for avoiding it, even to the extent of intensifying commitments in order to bring the situation to a definitive conclusion

Action (physics · Economics · Microeconomics · Monarchy · Order (exchange · Political science · Politics · Sunk costs · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · International Development and Aid · Law · Natural Resources and Economic Development