Contrastivism and non-contrastivism in scientific explanation
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 4079151 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Yafeng Shan (0000-0001-7736-1822, Tel Aviv University, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2019 |
| Volumen | 14 |
| Número | 8 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2019-08-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Philosophy Compass (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991 |
| Editorial | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/phc3.12613 |
| OpenAlex | W2964834526 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 1 |
| Referencias citadas | 13 |
The nature of scientific explanation is controversial. Some maintain that all scientific explanations have to be contrastive in nature (contrastivism). However, others argue that no scientific explanation is genuinely contrastive (non-contrastivism). In addition, a compatibilist view has been recently devloped. It is argued that the debate between contrastivism and non-contrastivism is merely a linguistic dispute rather than a genuine disagreement on the nature of scientific explanation. Scientific explanations are both contrastive and non-contrastive in some sense (compatibilism). This paper examines the debate between contrastivism and non-contrastivism in scientific explanation. It begins with a critical review of the arguments for contrastivism, for non-contrastivism, and for compatibilism and concludes with some remarks on the prospect of the issue
Compatibilism · Epistemology · Free will · Scientific theory · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
| Obras citantes distintas | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 0,17 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2020 - 2020 (1) |
| Velocidad de citación | historical |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 1 |