Causal Models and Metaphysics - Part 1
Using Causal Models
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 4079367 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Jennifer Mcdonald (0000-0001-9830-9716, Columbia University, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2024 |
| Volumen | 19 |
| Número | 4 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2024-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Philosophy Compass (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991 |
| Editorial | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/phc3.12975 |
| OpenAlex | W4399128532 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Referencias citadas | 47 |
This paper provides a general introduction to the use of causal models in the metaphysics of causation, specifically structural equation models and directed acyclic graphs. It reviews the formal framework, lays out a method of interpretation capable of representing different underlying metaphysical relations, and describes the use of these models in analyzing causation
Causal chain · Causal model · Econometrics · Epistemology · Metaphysics · Statistics · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Psychology
Mental Causation
Causality
Causation, Prediction, and Search
Causation
Real Definition
Causation as Influence
The Intransitivity of Causation Revealed in Equations and Graphs
Meaning and Necessity. A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic
A Regularity Theory of Causation
Causes and Explanations
Actual causation
A principled approach to defining actual causation
The problem of variable choice
Conjoined cases
Causal Models, Token Causation, and Processes
Prevention, Preemption, and the Principle of Sufficient Reason
A Model-Invariant Theory of Causation
A Tale of Two Effects
Response to Strevens
Causal counterfactuals without miracles or backtracking
A Probabilistic Analysis of Causation
Graded Causation and Defaults
Causes As Difference-Makers
Causation
| Velocidad de citación | historical |
|---|---|
| Altamente citado | No |