The Uses of Aesthetic Testimony
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 4158094 |
|---|---|
| Autores | C Thi Nguyen (0000-0001-8062-5446, Utah Valley University, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2017 |
| Volumen | 57 |
| Número | 1 |
| Páginas | 19-36 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2017-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | No |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | The British Journal of Aesthetics (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0007-0904 • E-ISSN: 1468-2842 |
| Editorial | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/aesthj/ayw089 |
| OpenAlex | W2589233331 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 17 |
The current debate over aesthetic testimony typically focuses on cases of doxastic repetition — where, when an agent, on receiving aesthetic testimony that p, acquires the belief that p without qualification. I suggest that we broaden the set of cases under consideration. I consider a number of cases of action from testimony, including reconsidering a disliked album based on testimony, and choosing an artistic educational institution from testimony. But this cannot simply be explained by supposing that testimony is usable for action, but unusable for doxastic repetition. I consider a new asymmetry in the usability aesthetic testimony. Consider the following cases: we seem unwilling to accept somebody hanging a painting in their bedroom based merely on testimony, but entirely willing to accept hanging a painting in a museum based merely on testimony. The switch in intuitive acceptability seems to track, in some complicated way, the line between public life and private life. These new cases weigh against a number of standing theories of aesthetic testimony. I suggest that we look further afield, and that something like a sensibility theory, in the style of John McDowell and David Wiggins, will prove to be the best fit for our intuitions for the usability of aesthetic testimony. I propose the following explanation for the new asymmetry: we are willing to accept testimony about whether a work merits being found beautiful; but we are unwilling to accept testimony about whether something actually is beautiful
Action (physics · Aesthetics · Art · Cognitive psychology · Complicity · Doxastic logic · Epistemology · Illusion · Painting · Political science · Repetition (rhetorical device · Sensibility · Set (abstract data type · Visual arts · Aesthetic Perception and Analysis · Computer Science · Ethics, Aesthetics, and Art · Law · Philosophy · Psychology · Visual Culture and Art Theory
Why Didn't Nietzsche Get His Act Together?
The Aesthetic Constitution of Genders
Aesthetic selves as objects of interpersonal understanding
Aesthetic Autonomy and Norms of Exposure
Aesthetic Acquaintance
Aesthetic peerhood and the significance of aesthetic peer disagreement
Knowledge of things and aesthetic testimony
Non-Monotonic Theories of Aesthetic Value
Games
Immoral Artists and Our Aesthetic Projects
Institutional Responsibility and Aesthetic Value
Art, imagination, and experiential knowledge
Cognitive islands and runaway echo chambers
Aesthetic acquaintance in practice
Aesthetic Testimony and Aesthetic Authenticity
Higher-Order Evidence in Aesthetics
Show, Don't Tell
| Obras citantes distintas | 17 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 2,83 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2020 - 2026 (7) |
| Velocidad de citación | current |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 17 |