Mexico's battle with monopolies

Reputation-Based Autonomy and Self-Undermining Effects in Antitrust Enforcement

Datos Bibliográficos

ID4237331
AutoresMelike Arslan (0000-0002-3989-5177, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, autor de correspondencia)
Año2024
Fecha de publicación2024-05-31
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaSocio-Economic Review (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 1475-1461 • E-ISSN: 1475-147X
DOI10.1093/ser/mwae036
OpenAlexW4399262618
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas1
Referencias citadas34

Despite increased scholarly attention to competition law enforcement against corporate monopolies, our understanding of this topic in developing countries remains very limited. This article addresses this gap by focusing on Mexico, using enforcement statistics, expert interviews and documentary resources. I find that Mexico initially pursued surprisingly high levels of anti-monopoly enforcement, which was followed by an equally surprising decline. Departing from the previous research that emphasized the influence of expert ideas, business power and international models, this study highlights two factors shaping the enforcement of competition law on monopolies in developing country contexts: the strategies employed by newly established competition authorities to foster organizational autonomy through a positive public reputation, and the subsequent self-undermining effects of these strategies. In addition to advancing the existing literature on competition policies, these findings shed light on the factors behind local variations in globally diffused institutions and the limitations of reputation-based bureaucratic autonomy

Autonomy · Battle · Business · Consent decree · Economics · Enforcement · Geography · Law and economics · Political science · Reputation · Merger and Competition Analysis · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Regulation and Compliance Studies · Law