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Humean Nature

How Desire Explains Action, Thought, and Feeling

Datos Bibliográficos

ID4351237
AutoresErrol Lord (University of Pennsylvania)
Año2019
Volumen69
Número274
Páginas202-206
Fecha de publicación2019-01-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
EditorialOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1093/pq/pqy033
OpenAlexW2883092575
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas3

Humean theories of moral psychology explain the phenomena just by appeal to beliefs and desires. Once Humean moral psychology was orthodoxy, but then a revolt against it flourished for several—productive—decades. Now a Humean counter-revolt is under way. Here Neil Sinhababu joins the counter-revolt. I recommend it for those interested in the central notions of moral psychology—desire, intention, moral judgment, and will power. Although it has its quirks, it provides many interesting arguments and is sure to stimulate future discussion. Sinhababu's Humean theory centres on two theses, the Desire-Belief Theory of Action and the Desire-Belief Theory of Reasoning: Desire-Belief Theory of Action: One is motivated to A if and only if desire that E is combined with belief that one can raise E’s probability by A-ing. Desire-Belief Theory of Reasoning: Desire that M is created as the conclusion of reasoning if and only if the reasoning combines desire that E with belief that M would raise E’s probability. It is eliminated as the conclusion of reasoning if and only if the reasoning eliminates such a combination

Action (physics · Epistemology · Feeling · Moral psychology · Moral reasoning · Practical reason · Emotions and Moral Behavior · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Philosophy

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    Open Access•Errol Lord, Kurt Sylvan•Journal of Ethics and Social…•2019

  • Desire as Belief

    Alex Gregory•Desire As Belief•2021

Obras citantes distintas3
Citas por año0,43
Intervalo de citas2019 - 2021 (3)
Velocidad de citaciónhistorical
Altamente citadoNo
Tipos de citaNeutras: 3

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