Knowledge Ascriptions and the Psychological Consequences of Thinking About Error
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 4351602 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Jennifer Nagel (0000-0002-0960-0497, University of Toronto, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2010 |
| Volumen | 60 |
| Número | 239 |
| Páginas | 286-306 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2010-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | No |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Editorial | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2009.624.x |
| OpenAlex | W1966866875 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 36 |
Epistemologists generally agree that the stringency of intuitive ascriptions of knowledge is increased when unrealized possibilities of error are mentioned. Non‐sceptical invariantists (Williamson, Hawthorne) think it a mistake to yield in such cases to the temptation to be more stringent, but they do not deny that we feel it. They contend that the temptation is best explained as the product of a psychological bias known as the availability heuristic. I argue against the availability explanation, and sketch a rival account of what happens to us psychologically when possibilities of error are raised
Cognitive psychology · Cognitive science · Epistemology · Occupational Health and Safety Research · Philosophy · Psychology
Pragmatic encroachment in epistemology
Persistence of Misinformation
Group Knowledge, Questions, and the Division of Epistemic Labour
Just Kidding? Two Roles for the Concept of Joking in Political Speech
Epistemic Egocentrism and Processing of Vaccine Misinformation (Vis-à-vis Scientific Evidence)
Unacknowledged Permissivism
Much at stake in knowledge
Knowledge in the face of conspiracy conditionals
Antiluminosity, Excuses and the Sufficiency of Knowledge for Rational Action
Knowledge is a mental state (at least sometimes)
Inquiry and trust
An empirical investigation of intuitions about uptake
The neural and cognitive mechanisms of knowledge attribution
Should I say that? An experimental investigation of the norm of assertion
Salient Alternatives in Perspective
Solidarity with Chrystul Kizer
Refined Invariantism
A Match Made in (Rational) Heaven? How Credences Relate to Probability Beliefs
Epistemic Anxiety and Adaptive Invariantism
Intuitions and Experiments
Defending the Evidential Value of Epistemic Intuitions
Knowledge, conservatism, and pragmatics
The puzzle of plausible deniability
Philosophical intuitions, heuristics, and metaphors
Knowledge embedded
Epistemic anxiety and epistemic risk
Error possibility, contextualism, and bias
Knowledge, belief, and egocentric bias
Knowledge and implicatures
Knowledge and non-traditional factors
Philosophical expertise under the microscope
Knowledge judgements and cognitive psychology
Some Recent Work in Experimental Epistemology
Non-Traditional Factors in Judgments about Knowledge
How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment
Standing Up for Philosophy
| Obras citantes distintas | 36 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 2,25 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2010 - 2026 (17) |
| Velocidad de citación | current |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 35 |