Is Perception a Propositional Attitude
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 4351992 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Tim Crane (0000-0001-9455-3957, University College London, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2009 |
| Volumen | 59 |
| Número | 236 |
| Páginas | 452-469 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2009-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | No |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Editorial | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.608.x |
| OpenAlex | W2164420279 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 53 |
It is widely agreed that perceptual experience is a form of intentionality, i.e., that it has representational content. Many philosophers take this to mean that like belief, experience has propositional content, that it can be true or false. I accept that perceptual experience has intentionality; but I dispute the claim that it has propositional content. This claim does not follow from the fact that experience is intentional, nor does it follow from the fact that experiences are accurate or inaccurate. I end by considering the relationship between this question and the question of whether experience has non‐conceptual content
Cognitive psychology · Content (measure theory) · Epistemology · Intentionality · Perception · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Social Psychology
The do‐able solution to the interface problem
Why Perceptual Experiences cannot be Probabilistic
Kant and Animals
Pragmatic Mental Imagery
Vicarious Perception
Pragmatic Representations
Perception
Action
All Sense-Perceptions Are True
Between Perception and Action
Animal Logic
Perception as a propositional attitude
Modest Propositional Contents in Non-Human Animals
Information in Explaining Cognition
Inner Speech and ‘Pure’ Thought – Do we Think in Language
The extended mind argument against phenomenal intentionality
Is Heidegger’s Account of Intentionality Inconsistent with Representationalism About Perception
Perception as a contentful relation
Belief, perception, and the laws of appearance
Reasoning with knowledge of things
Emotion
On the Difference Between Realistic and Fantastic Imagining
Another Look at Mode Intentionalism
The Relationship Between Conscious and Unconscious Intentionality
A puzzle about hallucination
Ramsification and the ramifications of Prior's puzzle
Imagination constrained, imagination constructed
Aristotle on Perception and Perception-like Appearance
Of fillings and feelings
Truth without truths
Truth or Accuracy
A philosophically neutral semantics for perception sentences
Perception Without Propositions
In Defense of Perceptual Content
The Right to Mental Autonomy
Brentano's Empiricism and the Philosophy of Intentionality
The city as an information system
Another look at color primitivism
Intelligent action guidance and the use of mixed representational formats
Perceptual justification and objectual attitudes
Fodor’s guide to the Humean mind
The conceptual nature of imaginative content
Temporalism and eternalism reconsidered
Simple Remembering
Nonconceptual apprehension and the reason-giving character of perception
Reasoning, rationality, and representation
On the importance of correctly locating content
The structure of sensorimotor explanation
A twofold tale of one mind
What the Senses Cannot ‘Say’
Evaluating action possibilities
Referring to the Qualitative Dimension of Consciousness
Non-Propositional Attitudes
| Obras citantes distintas | 53 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 3,79 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2012 - 2026 (15) |
| Velocidad de citación | current |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 52 |