Between Deflationism and Inflationism

A Moderate View on Truth and Reference

Datos Bibliográficos

ID4352156
AutoresGraham Seth Moore (0000-0003-2080-632X, University of British Columbia, autor de correspondencia)
Año2022
Volumen72
Número3
Páginas673-694
Fecha de publicación2022-06-03
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
EditorialOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/pq/pqab058
OpenAlexW3213619021
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas1
Referencias citadas15

This essay argues for a two-part thesis concerning the deflationist theories of truth and reference. First, I identify two points of contrast between the deflationist theories and their traditional inflationary opponents: (1) they each employ different orders of explanation for the variety of semantic phenomena, and (2) the inflationist is typically taken to be beholden to a reductive explanation of reference, whereas the deflationist is doubtful of this project. Secondly, I argue that these two points of contrast need not come together to exhaust the space of possible views. There is room for a plausible middle ground: a moderate version of inflationism. My moderate inflationism will reject the deflationist's order of explanation, so it counts as genuinely inflationary. However, it also rejects the reductionist ambitions of the earlier inflationists, so it isn't an apt target for deflationary scepticism

Contrast (vision) · Economics · Epistemology · Linguistics · Order (exchange) · Reductionism · Skepticism · Space (punctuation) · Variety (cybernetics) · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

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