Personal Identity and Thought-Experiments

Datos Bibliográficos

ID4352199
AutoresTamar Szabó Gendler (Syracuse University, autor de correspondencia)
Año2002
Volumen52
Número206
Páginas34-54
Fecha de publicación2002-01-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
EditorialOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/1467-9213.00251
OpenAlexW2054749371
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas11
Referencias citadas15

Through careful analysis of a specific example, Parfit’s ‘fission argument’ for the unimportance of personal identity, I argue that our judgements concerning imaginary scenarios are likely to be unreliable when the scenarios involve disruptions of certain contingent correlations. Parfit’s argument depends on our hypothesizing away a number of facts which play a central role in our understanding and employment of the very concept under investigation; as a result, it fails to establish what Parfit claims, namely, that identity is not what matters. I argue that Parfit’s conclusion can be blocked without denying that he has presented an imaginary case where prudential concern would be rational in the absence of identity. My analysis depends on the recognition that the features that explain or justify a relation may be distinct from the features that underpin it as necessary conditions

Aesthetics · Identity (music) · Personal identity · Self-concept · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy, Science, and History · Psychology · Social Psychology