The Comparative and the Exemplary

Revisiting the Early History of Molecular Biology

Datos Bibliográficos

ID4392890
AutoresBruno J Strasser (0000-0002-2773-6670, Yale University), Soraya De Chadarevian (0000-0002-4360-7203, UCLA)
Año2011
Volumen49
Número3
Páginas317-336
Fecha de publicación2011-09-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaHistory of Science (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0073-2753 • E-ISSN: 1753-8564
EditorialSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/007327531104900305
OpenAlexW1562650416
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas13
Referencias citadas29

INTRODUCTIONThe image and caricature of the biologist roaming the field with a collecting box or poring over pinned up insect and butterfly cases endured well into the twentieth century. In contrast the vision of life, and even more so biology, the quintessential science of the late twentieth century, has most often been connected with experimenting and intervening on a handful of model organisms and systems. Underpinning this widespread opposition is the idea that biology as practised by naturalists was merely descriptive, systematic, and comparative. Naturalists would rely on collecting and comparing specimens, providing names and descriptions, and thereby document biological diversity. This way of approaching the natural world was supposedly superseded by the experimental approach in the late nineteenth century, with biologists taking up that banner in the twentieth. Using ever more powerful instruments, imported from the physical and chemical sciences, and focusing their attention on a few well-chosen model systems, they studied processes and their underlying mechanisms. This view of the history has been promoted by latter-day biologists and by historians alike.1 Historians of biology have insisted, for example, on the crucial role of the Rockefeller Foundation, since the 1930s, in promoting approaches in the life sciences by providing funding for the acquisition of costly new physical and chemical instruments.2 The vision of life was predicated upon sophisticated means of intervention which produced representations enabling further manipulations of life.3 Equal attention has been dedicated to the strategic choice of a few simple model organisms on which much of the early work in biology was developed. We can think here of Max Delbruck' s introduction of phage for the study of genetics, and the extensive use of bacteria and viruses in studying genetic mechanisms in terms, but also of moulds (Neurospora crassa), flies (Drosophila melanogaster), and later, worms (Caenorhabditis elegans), mice (Mus Musculus), and weeds (Arabidopsis thaliana), which all gained the enviable status (at least from the researcher's perspective) of model organism for the production of knowledge in biology.4One of the historiographie side-effects of writing disciplinary histories, such as those of biology mentioned previously, has been a tendency to emphasize cognitive, methodological, and sociological unity within the disciplines and differences among disciplines. By contrast, John Pickstone's call to focus on of (or knowledges), rather than disciplines, can help us make visible the heterogeneity of cognitive and material practices within disciplines and the similarities among disciplines. Indeed, according to Pickstone, even though ways of knowing have their own historicity and have, for example, enjoyed their greatest successes at different times, they do not replace each other, like Kuhnian paradigms, but add new layers in the makeup of science, technology and medicine.5 Pickstone's historiographie approach, unlike that of many others proponents of 'styles', is not taxonomic, but analytic; it reveals the different components which make up scientific practices. This perspective proves fruitful for a closer examination of the working practices of modern biologists. As we show in this paper, biology did not take shape exclusively as an experimental science focused on 'exemplary' model organism and systems. Rather, much work in biology can be described more accurately as comparative and relied far more than previously recognized on collections. This is true not only for late twentieth-century genomic scientists, who have been derided as molecular birdwatchers,6 but also of early day biologists, those most vehement in condemning natural history.7 In their studies of the most challenging problems of the new science, namely the structure and function of proteins and nucleic acids and the deciphering of the genetic code, they relied heavily on collections and comparisons of data, the distinctive approach of the comparative biological sciences, usually associated with nineteenth-century natural history, anatomy, and embryology

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