How do we tell an association from a rule? Comment on Sloman (1996)

Datos Bibliográficos

ID4423873
AutoresGerd Gigerenzer (0000-0002-6163-5419, Max Planck Society), Terry Regier (0000-0003-0808-5208)
Año1996
Volumen119
Número1
Páginas23-26
Fecha de publicación1996-01-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaPsychological Bulletin (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0033-2909 • E-ISSN: 1939-1455
EditorialAmerican Psychological Association (APA) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1037/0033-2909.119.1.23
OpenAlexW2099187491
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas42
Referencias citadas8

S. A. Sloman's (1996) intriguing argument for separate associative and rule-based reasoning systems is unfortunately damaged by a certain amount of slack in the distinction he makes between these two posited mental mechanisms. The authors suggest that the distinction could be sharpened by overt reference to explicit models of associative and rule-based processing. They also point out that "simultaneous contradictory belief, " which Sloman takes as evidence for separate associative and rule-based systems, need not be interpreted in this fashion. It may also signal a number of other things, including the presence of linguistic ambiguity (as in the Linda problem), competing lines of formal reasoning (as in the Wason selection task), and unclarined assumptions (as in the 3 doors problem). In 1973, Allen Newell, torn between being distressed and content with the state of research on information processing, entitled a commentary "You Can't Play 20 Questions With Na-ture and Win. " Newell's distressed half fear that when behavior is explained in terms of binary oppositions—serial versus par-allel, grammars versus associations, nature versus nurture, and

Association (psychology) · Association rule learning · Cognitive psychology · Artificial Intelligence · Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference · Child and Animal Learning Development · Computer Science · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Psychology · Social Psychology