Containing Iraq

Sanctions Worked

Datos Bibliográficos

ID4452569
AutoresGeorge A Lopez (0000-0001-9377-8695), George Α Lopez (0000-0003-4721-7955), David Cortright (0009-0009-4616-4805)
Año2004
Volumen83
Número4
Páginas90
Fecha de publicación2004-01-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaForeign Affairs (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0015-7120 • E-ISSN: 2327-7793
EditorialJSTOR (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/20034049
OpenAlexW199716576
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas23

THE Bush administration's primary justification for going to war against Iraq last year was the threat posed by Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. But almost as soon as U.S. forces took Baghdad, it became clear that this fear was based on bad intelligence and faulty assumptions. Since then, the failure to find WMD in Iraq has caused a furor. Sympathetic analysts argue that Washington had no way of know ing how serious the threat of Iraqi WMD was, so intelligence agencies provided the administration with a wide-ranging set of estimates. In the post-September 1i security environment, the argument goes, the Bush administration had little choice but to assume the worst. Critics charge that the White House inflated and manipulated weak, ambiguous intelligence to paint Iraq as an urgent threat and thus make an optional war seem necessary. A recent report by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, for example, found not only that the intelligence community had overestimated Iraqi chemical and biological weapons capabilities but also that administration officials systematically misrepresented the threat posed by Iraqi weapons. Public debate has focused on the question of what went wrong with U.S. intelligence. Given the deteriorated state of Iraq's unconventional

Business · Political science · Sanctions · Intelligence, Security, War Strategy · Law