Teleology in Kant's Philosophy of History

Datos Bibliográficos

ID4496239
AutoresBurleigh Taylor Wilkins (autor de correspondencia)
Año1966
Volumen5
Número2
Páginas172
Fecha de publicación1966-01-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaHistory and Theory (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0018-2656 • E-ISSN: 1468-2303
EditorialJSTOR (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/2504513
OpenAlexW2325221617
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas5

Kant's Idea of Universal History from Cosmopolitan Point of View was written, without apologies, from teleological point of view. Read in conjunction with treatments of teleology in Critique of Pure Reason and Critique of Judgment, Kant's essay philosophy of history acquires greater significance for his overall philosophy than is generally acknowledged. With its teleology in mind we can see as being something more than by-product of Kant's moral and political convictions and his belief in progress. We can relate directly to his theory of knowledge, especially his distinction between reason and understanding, and read as an attempted application to historical inquiry of principles that Kant elsewhere develops in more abstract manner. Kant begins his essay by making three important points: (1) that human actions are determined by universal laws; (2) that history affords by and large repugnant spectacle; and (3) that we may yet be able to discover in history a clue as to what universal laws of human actions are, and that such discovery may help us make sense of seemingly senseless character of much of human history. Kant argues that (1) is true regardless of views one may hold concerning freedom of will. What appears to be tangled and unrelated in case of individuals can be recognized, according to Kant, in the history of whole species as continually advancing, though slow, development of its original capacities and endowments. He cites marriages, births, and deaths as examples of things that appear to be greatly influenced by man's free will; but he notes triumphantly that the annual statistics of great countries prove that these events take place according to constant natural laws. The optimism of (1) is, however, qualified considerably by Kant's admission that, because man's actions are neither purely instinctual nor purely rational, it appears as if no regular systematic history of mankind would be possible. Kant confesses to certain repugnance upon looking at man's conduct: with but few exceptions seems on examining externally as if whole web of human history were woven out of folly and childish vanity, and frenzy of destruction ... .91

Epistemology · History of philosophy · Philosophy of history · Teleology · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Philosophy