The Idea of a History of Philosophy

Datos Bibliográficos

ID4496592
AutoresJohn Passmore (autor de correspondencia)
Año1965
Volumen5
Páginas1
Fecha de publicación1965-01-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaHistory and Theory (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0018-2656 • E-ISSN: 1468-2303
EditorialJSTOR (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/2504117
OpenAlexW2314861104
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas14

are learned men, wrote Kant in the Introduction to his Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics (1783), whom the history of philosophy is philosophy itself; for such men the present prolegomena have not been written. They must wait until those who attempt to draw the fountain of reason itself have made their case; it is then the historian's task to the what has been done. Moreover, in their opinion, nothing can be said which has not been said already, and indeed we can infallibly predict that this will always be the case ... one can hardly expect not to be able to match every new theory with some old theory not unlike it. My object is to persuade all those who think metaphysics worth studying that for the time being it is absolutely necessary to postpone the historical labour, to as undone all that has been done, and to start first of all with the question: 'Whether such a thing as metaphysics is at all possible?' There could be no better summing up to the attitude of a great many creative philosophers to the historian. Artists, very often, have a comparable attitude to critics. Whereas philosophy draws from the fountain of reason itself, historians, Kant is saying, do no more than tell the world what the philosopher has drawn that fountain. It is not for the historian to draw it on his own behalf. The historian, Kant further suggests, discourages philosophers by trying to show that what the philosopher believes himself to have discovered is in fact no more than a rehash of some ancient doctrine. Finally, Kant argues, the creative philosopher may need to start afresh, to consider as undone all that has been done; by reminding him of the past, the historian does him a disservice. This paper is designed, in a way, as a reply to Kant. But it is a reply which will concede a good many of Kant's objections, or will grant, at least, that there has been much to justify them in the actual procedures of historians of

Epistemology · Philosophy of history · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Philosophy