Profitable inefficiency

The politics of port infrastructure in Mombasa, Kenya

Datos Bibliográficos

ID4775652
AutoresHugh Lamarque (University of Edinburgh, autor de correspondencia)
Año2019
Volumen57
Número1
Páginas85-109
Fecha de publicación2019-03-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Journal of Modern African Studies (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0022-278X • E-ISSN: 1469-7777
EditorialCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0022278x18000630
OpenAlexW2918833099
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas9
Referencias citadas20

This article examines the distribution of power among public, private and criminal interests invested in Mombasa port. It approaches Kenya as a gatekeeper state, in which national elites compete to control the country's points of interaction with the rest of the world. Mombasa's controversial private dry ports are used to highlight (1) how the opportunity to profit from inefficiencies in container storage has been distributed among the political elite, and (2) how the development of the country's principal seaport not only reflects Kenya's underlying political settlements, but is one of the key sites in which those settlements are tested and reshaped. The case exposes a dynamic interaction between Kenya's shifting political settlement on the one hand, and the gate itself - Mombasa port's physical infrastructure and regulations - on the other

Business · Economics · Economy · Elite · Geography · Government (linguistics · Human settlement · Inefficiency · Market economy · Payment · Political science · Politics · Port (circuit theory · Profit (economics · Settlement (finance · State (computer science · Engineering · Finance · Global Maritime and Colonial Histories · Socioeconomic Development in Asia · Water Governance and Infrastructure