Dispositional accounts of abilities

Datos Bibliográficos

ID4862792
AutoresBarbara Vetter (0000-0001-6547-6657, Freie Universität Berlin, autor de correspondencia), Romy Jaster (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin)
Año2017
Volumen12
Número8
Fecha de publicación2017-08-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaPhilosophy Compass (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/phc3.12432
OpenAlexW2744098190
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas8
Referencias citadas30

This paper explores the prospects for dispositional accounts of abilities. According to so-called new dispositionalists, an agent has the ability to Φ iff they have a disposition to Φ when trying (or being otherwise properly motivated) to Φ. We show that the new dispositionalism is beset by some problems that also beset its predecessor, the conditional analysis of abilities, and bring up some further problems. We then turn to a different approach, which links abilities not to motivational states but to the notion of success, and consider ways of implementing that approach. Our results suggest that there are principled disanalogies between abilities and disposition which prevent any dispositional account of abilities from succeeding

Cognitive psychology · Disposition · Epistemology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Social Psychology