Foreign direct investment and discriminatory environmental enforcement

A Firm Level Perspective

Datos Bibliográficos

ID4922893
AutoresQing Deng (0000-0002-1598-7552, Department of Political Science, The Pennsylvania State University, PA, USA, autor de correspondencia)
Año2021
Volumen30
Número6
Páginas958-980
Fecha de publicación2021-09-19
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaEnvironmental Politics (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0964-4016 • E-ISSN: 1743-8934
EditorialInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/09644016.2020.1817257
OpenAlexW3108365186
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas2
Referencias citadas55

This study focuses on de facto environmental enforcement and tests whether the practice of environmental enforcement discriminates against foreign-invested firms in a developing country. Using original firm-level enforcement data in the Jiangsu province of China, 2012–2014, this article examines the effect of foreign ownership on the enforcement of three regulatory instruments: economic incentives, command-and-control, and naming-and-shaming. After controlling for firms’ environmental performance, I find that firms with foreign ownership 1) pay fewer pollution fees, 2) are less likely to be punished, and 3) are more likely to obtain the highest score in the environmental credit rating system than domestic firms

Business · China · De facto · Economics · Enforcement · Environmental regulation · Foreign direct investment · Foreign ownership · Incentive · Market economy · Public economics · Climate Change Policy and Economics · Energy, Environment, Economic Growth · Environmental Sustainability in Business · Law