Knowledge and Dogmatism
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 4987900 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Peter Baumann (0000-0003-0991-6288, Swarthmore College, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2013 |
| Volumen | 63 |
| Número | 250 |
| Páginas | 1-19 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2013-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | No |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Editorial | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2012.00104.x |
| OpenAlex | W2054690454 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 7 |
There is a sceptical puzzle according to which knowledge appears to license an unacceptable kind of dogmatism. Here is a version of the corresponding sceptical argument: (1) If a subject S knows a proposition p, then it is OK for S to ignore all evidence against p as misleading; (2) It is never OK for any subject to ignore any evidence against their beliefs as misleading; (3) Hence, nobody knows anything.I distinguish between different versions of the puzzle (mainly a permissibility version and a closure version) and offer a solution for one version (the permissibility version) of the problem. No matter how much a subject knows, knowledge never gives one a license to ignore evidence against a proposition. Premise (1) of the argument is false and the puzzle can thus be resolved
Library science · Media studies · Physics · Sociology · Volume (thermodynamics) · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy
| Obras citantes distintas | 7 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 1,75 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2022 - 2025 (4) |
| Velocidad de citación | recent |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 7 |