The politics of corporate responsibility and child labour in the Bangladeshi garment industry

Datos Bibliográficos

ID5081004
AutoresMichael E Nielsen (0000-0002-0388-1187), Michael Nielsen (0000-0002-3161-6823, Copenhagen Business School, autor de correspondencia)
Año2005
Volumen81
Número3
Páginas559-580
Fecha de publicación2005-05-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaInternational Affairs (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0020-5850 • E-ISSN: 1468-2346
EditorialOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/j.1468-2346.2005.00469.x
OpenAlexW2017101826
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas11

In 1995—after more than two-and-a-half years—a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) concerning child labour in the Bangladeshi garment industry was signed by the Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA), UNICEF (Bangladesh) and the International Labour Office (ILO), Bangladesh. The agreement and the process were uniquely important in a number of respects and this article explores a question that remains almost unasked, although paradoxically it has often been answered: why did the agreement come into existence and take that particular form? This article provides a detailed and documented analysis of the process leading up to the MOU offering not only new insight but also challenging some of the widely held views about it. Most importantly, the analysis confirms the significance of the so-called Harkin bill and the subsequent threat of boycott as the basic drivers of the entire process. It also points to the use of the Harkin bill by the Asian- American Free Labor Institute (AAFLI) on the ground and the way this was related to AAFLI's active engagement in labour organizing there, concluding that ‘protectionism in disguise’ was hardly the motive. Furthermore, by highlighting the drawn-out nature of the process and uncovering the close links between AAFLI, the International Labor Rights Fund (ILRF) and the Child Labor Coalition (CLC), the analysis challenges claims that the industry critics were uninformed and misguided, and points out that statements warning against ‘rushing into boycotts’ ought not to be based on what occurred in Bangladesh. The article argues that taking into account the efforts it took to move the BGMEA in this case, the approval of softer tactics and the critique and/or rejection of tougher tactics, was as naive as trade sanctions are blunt. In conclusion, in the light of the reported negative consequences for the children becoming a dominant theme in the process, the analysis acknowledges the importance of awareness of the risk of such consequences. However, the article points out that not only were industry critics aware of this and tried from the outset to make the industry accept some kind of responsibility, but also that the negative consequences have their own results serving to redefine the problem, narrowing the agenda and/or transferring moral culpability from corporations to critics

Antipathy · Boycott · Child labour · Economics · International trade · Memorandum · Memorandum of understanding · Political science · Politics · Protectionism · Sociology · Work (physics) · Engineering · Global trade, sustainability, and social impact · Law