Perception
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 5087323 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Douglas Odegard (University of Guelph, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 1978 |
| Volumen | 17 |
| Número | 1 |
| Páginas | 72-91 |
| Fecha de publicación | 1978-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Dialogue (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949 |
| Editorial | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0012217300024094 |
| OpenAlex | W4247660470 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 1 |
| Referencias citadas | 8 |
I Shall offer a realist theory of perception which in an important sense is neither direct nor representational nor causal.Let us say that we directly perceive something if perceiving it enables us to know of its existence without having evidence of its existence. In this sense, direct perception allows us to have "direct knowledge" of what we perceive. For example, I see after-images directly, since I can know of their existence without having visual evidence of their existence. I do not have to look at them with my eyes. Granted, I do need evidence in order to know that they are after-images; but not in order to know of their existence as colours or shapes. Also, I do have to see them in order to know that they exist. But this is not a condition of having evidence. It is only a condition of their existence, which in turn is a truth condition of my knowing
Cognitive psychology · Epistemology · Order (exchange) · Perception · Historical Philosophy and Science · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy, Science, and History · Psychology
| Obras citantes distintas | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 0,03 |
| Intervalo de citas | 1993 - 1993 (1) |
| Velocidad de citación | historical |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 1 |