The Use of Bargaining Games in Local Development Policy

Datos Bibliográficos

ID5111688
AutoresAnnette Steinacker (Economic Policy Institute, autor de correspondencia)
Año2002
Volumen19
Número4
Páginas120-153
Fecha de publicación2002-12-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaReview of Policy Research (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 1541-132X • E-ISSN: 1541-1338
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1541-1338.2002.tb00335.x
OpenAlexW2050081107
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas12
Referencias citadas14

Granting location incentives is a common city policy to attract new businesses, despite the frequent belief that the benefits are too generous. Can cities do a better job determining when to agree to these concessions and when to refuse? I argue that analyzing the concession decision with a simple bargaining game illustrates: (1) that the negotiation strategy a city uses should be based on the characteristics of the firm in each case and (2) that even poor cities with few attractive location features can avoid making large concessions. Development experiences in Miami-Dade are used to illustrate the model

Business · Economics · Incentive · Miami · Microeconomics · Negotiation · Political science · Public economics · Auction Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization