The Is/Ought Gap, the Fact/Value Distinction and the Naturalistic Fallacy
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 5134239 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Julian Dodd (0000-0003-1737-7616, University of Greater Manchester), Suzanne Stern-Gillet (0000-0002-4672-8633, University of Greater Manchester) |
| Año | 1995 |
| Volumen | 34 |
| Número | 4 |
| Páginas | 727-746 |
| Fecha de publicación | 1995-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Dialogue (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949 |
| Editorial | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0012217300011082 |
| OpenAlex | W2018001073 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 6 |
| Referencias citadas | 12 |
For the last 40 years or so the is/ought gap, the fact/value distinction and the naturalistic fallacy have figured prominently in ethical debates. This longevity, however, has had an adverse side effect. So familiar have they become that they-and their respective rationales-have tended to become blurred. It is the purpose of this paper to explain why they should be kept distinct
Economics · Epistemology · Fallacy · Longevity · Naturalism · Positive economics · Sociology · Value (mathematics) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Medicine · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Pragmatism in Philosophy and Education · Psychology
| Obras citantes distintas | 6 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 0,27 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2004 - 2025 (22) |
| Velocidad de citación | recent |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 5 |