Why Military Technology Is Difficult to Restrain
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 5197858 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Ted Greenwood (0000-0002-2208-0692, Institute for War and Peace Studies, Columbia University, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 1990 |
| Volumen | 15 |
| Número | 4 |
| Páginas | 412-429 |
| Fecha de publicación | 1990-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Science Technology & Human Values (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0162-2439 • E-ISSN: 1552-8251 |
| Editorial | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/016224399001500402 |
| OpenAlex | W2110941157 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 4 |
Military technology is difficult to restrain for many reasons. Military forces and associated technology serve important functions in the foreign policy of states. Military technology is also pursued to enhance military capability and cost-effectiveness of military forces, to ensure that one's own forces outperform those of an adversary, to play symbolic roles, and to preserve or improve stability in the international system. In addition, new military technology and new systems are advocated by military services and military equipment manufacturers for organizational and economic as well as strategic reasons. To date, arms control agreements have not significantly restrained innovation in military technology, nor are they likely to do so in the future. This is a result of asymmetries between the forces of the United States and the Soviet Union and of the intrinsic difficulties of designing arms control agreements that restrain technological innovation m ways that are both meaningful and verifiable. Although the difficulty of restraining military technology should temper expectations for both nuclear and con ventional arms control, there is no reason to believe that meaningful arms control will be rendered impossible as a consequence
Adversary · Arms control · Business · Computer security · Economics · Management · Military science · Military technology · Military theory · Military threat · Nuclear weapon · Political science · Strategic goal · Computer Science · Engineering · Law · Nuclear Issues and Defense
| Obras citantes distintas | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 0,11 |
| Intervalo de citas | 1990 - 2025 (36) |
| Velocidad de citación | recent |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 3 |