Mind-making practices

The Social Infrastructure of Self-Knowing Agency and Responsibility

Datos Bibliográficos

ID5778616
AutoresVictoria Mcgeer (0000-0002-7328-0563, University Center for Human Values, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, USA, autor de correspondencia)
Año2015
Volumen18
Número2
Páginas259-281
Fecha de publicación2015-05-04
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaPhilosophical Explorations (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 1386-9795 • E-ISSN: 1741-5918
EditorialTaylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/13869795.2015.1032331
OpenAlexW1750657604
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas47
Referencias citadas88

This paper is divided into two parts. In Section 1, I explore and defend a "regulative view" of folk-psychology as against the "standard view" (encompassing both theory-theory and simulation theory, as well as hybrid variations). On the regulative view, folk-psychology is conceptualized in fundamentally interpersonal terms as a "mind-making" practice through which we come to form and regulate our minds in accordance with a rich array of socially shared and socially maintained sense-making norms. It is not, as the standard view maintains, simply an epistemic capacity for coming to know about the mental states and dispositions already there. Importantly, the regulative view can meet and beat the standard at its own epistemic game. But it also does more. In Section 2, I show how the regulative view makes progress on two other problems that remain puzzling on the standard view: (1) the problem of "first-person authority" - accounting for the special features of self-knowledge; and (2) the problem of "reactive responsiveness" - accounting for our deep concern with calling one another to account for normatively untoward behaviour, both generally and in the moral domain

Child and Animal Learning Development · Embodied and Extended Cognition · Social Representations and Identity