Autonomy and Common Good

Interpreting Rousseau's General Will

Datos Bibliográficos

ID5793041
AutoresMichael J Thompson (0000-0001-6428-9817, William Paterson University, autor de correspondencia)
Año2017
Volumen25
Número2
Páginas266-285
Fecha de publicación2017-02-13
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaInternational Journal of Philosophical Studies (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0967-2559 • E-ISSN: 1466-4542
EditorialTaylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/09672559.2017.1286364
OpenAlexW2588982770
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas7
Referencias citadas21

Rousseau's project in his Social Contract was to construct a conception of human subjectivity and political institutions that would transcend what he saw to be the limits of liberal political theory of his time. I take this as a starting point to put forward an interpretation of his theory of the general will as a kind of social cognition that is able to preserve individual autonomy and freedom alongside concerns with the collective welfare of the community. But whereas many have seen Rousseau's ideas as a prelude to communitarianism or authoritarianism, we should instead see his project as articulating an alternative model of moral-cognitivist reasoning. In order to provide a framework for this interpretation, I propose reading his conception of the general will through the theory of collective intentionality and social ontology. I end with a consideration of how this interpretation of the general will can provide a more satisfying understanding of political and practical rationality contemporary debates over republicanism and liberalism

Common good · Communitarianism · Intentionality · Social contract · European Political History Analysis · Political Theory and Influence · Rousseau and Enlightenment Thought