When do business groups embrace outside lobbying in trade policy? The case of the CPTPP in Chile

Datos Bibliográficos

ID5874650
AutoresAndrés Dockendorf, Dorotea López (0000-0003-4819-7351)
Año2024
Volumen11
Número2
Páginas7-23
Fecha de publicación2024-08-05
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaEstudos Internacionais Revista de Relações Internacionais da PUC Minas (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 2317-773X • E-ISSN: 2317-773X
EditorialPontificia Universidade Catolica de Minas Gerais (PUBLISHER • BR)
DOI10.5752/p.2317-773x.2023v11n2p7-23
OpenAlexW4401545185
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas2
Referencias citadas13

Literature shows that business interest groups have fewer incentives to embrace outside lobbying in trade policy. This article proposes an alternative explanation. As we discuss, special economic interests are more likely to adopt a specific subtype of outside lobbying (press, media appearances and op-eds) when policymakers are not responsible to them, and their long-term interests associated with a model of open trade are potentially threatened. We test our argument with the case of Chile and the long debate around the CPTPP ratification process. Our results support the hypothesis: businesses have a greater probability of media appearances, publishing op-eds and the like in comparison to other lobbies, such as labor and single-issue groups against the treaty. However, the effect is conditional to salience: the subtype of outside lobbying from business groups is more likely to be observed as the distance to the social outbursts of October 2019 increases

Argument (complex analysis · Economics · Incentive · International economics · International trade · Law and economics · Microeconomics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Protectionism · Public economics · Publishing · Ratification · Salience (neuroscience · Treaty · EU Law and Policy Analysis · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Psychology · World Trade Organization Law · Law