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Individual Rights, Emergent Social States, and Behavioral Feasibility

Datos Bibliográficos

ID5917382
AutoresJames M Buchanan (George Mason University, autor de correspondencia)
Año1995
Volumen7
Número2
Páginas141-150
Fecha de publicación1995-04-01
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaRationality and Society (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 1043-4631 • E-ISSN: 1461-7358
EditorialSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/1043463195007002002
OpenAlexW2008177757
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas3
Referencias citadas13

Individuals retain control over at least some minimal dimensions of personal behavior. If this is acknowledged, social states are not, and cannot be, objects of choice. Social states emerge from the interdependent choices made by acting individuals and groups. Individuals may ordinally rank social states, but the objects for collective choice must be assignments of rights or rules. Failure to appreciate the distinction here leads to misguided efforts to attain positions that may be imagined but that are beyond the limits of behavioral feasibility

Control (management) · Economics · Interdependence · Law and economics · Microeconomics · Political science · Rank (graph theory) · Social dilemma · Sociology · State (computer science) · Computer Science · Economic Theory and Institutions · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Law · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology · Social Psychology

  • The Status of the Status Quo

    Open Access•James M Buchanan•Constitutional Political Economy•2004

  • Constitutional Choice and Prosperity

    Open Access•Martin Leschke•Constitutional Political Economy•2000

  • Constitutional artisans

    Open Access•Paul Lewis, Elizabeth A Morrow et al.•Constitutional Political Economy•2024

  • Social Choice and Individual Values

    Kenneth J Arrow, Eric S Maskin•Social Choice and Individual Values•2017

  • Anarchy, State, and Utopia

    Trudy Goiver•International Studies in Philosophy•1976

  • The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure

    Paul A Samuelson•The Review of Economics and…•1954

  • How can constitutions be designed so that politicians who seek to serve “public interest” can survive and prosper

    Open Access•James M Buchanan•Constitutional Political Economy•1993

  • Rational Action and Economic Theory

    Gary S Becker•Journal of Political Economy•1963

  • A general constitutional possibility theorem

    Open Access•Peter Bernholz•Public Choice•1986

  • Rational Action and Economic Theory

    Israel M Kirzner•Journal of Political Economy•1963

  • Irrational Behavior and Economic Theory

    Gary S Becker•Journal of Political Economy•1962

  • Social Choice, Democracy, and Free Markets

    James M Buchanan•Journal of Political Economy•1954

  • Rational Action and Economic Theory

    Israel M Kirzner•Journal of Political Economy•1962

  • The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal

    Amartya Sen•Journal of Political Economy•1970

  • On Appraising the Performance of an Economic System

    Frederick Van Der Ploeg, Rutledge Vining•Economica•1986

  • Liberty, Unanimity and Rights

    Amartya Sen•Economica•1976

Citas por año0,12
Intervalo de citas2000 - 2024 (25)
Altamente citadoNo

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