Corruption and Regulatory Structures

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6090185
AutoresAnthony Ogus (University of Manchester, autor de correspondencia)
Año2004
Volumen26
Número3-4
Páginas329-346
Fecha de publicación2004-10-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaLaw & Policy (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0265-8240 • E-ISSN: 1467-9930
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1467-9930.2004.00181.x
OpenAlexW1998801203
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas10
Referencias citadas46

The methods of constraining corruption typically adopted in Western industrialized societies, increasing the transparency and accountability of decision‐making, and intensifying the enforcement of criminal justice prohibitions, have not always proved to be effective in developing countries. This is not surprising, given that in many of them the resources available for law enforcement are relatively modest, and corruption is deeply embedded culturally. In this paper, I suggest a strategy of reducing the opportunities for corruption, rather than attempting to suppress it altogether. I focus on regulatory institutions and procedures, identifying key aspects to these arrangements, which, if appropriately designed, can achieve this goal. Some of the design strategies that I advocate are inconsistent with the models of regulatory arrangements that Western institutions have been urging developing countries to adopt

Accountability · Business · Computer security · Developing country · Economic growth · Economic Justice · Economics · Enforcement · Key (lock · Language change · Law and economics · Law enforcement · Political science · Public economics · Transparency (behavior · Computer Science · Corruption and Economic Development · Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance · Law · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems