Ethical Limitations on the State's Use of Arational Persuasion

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6090280
AutoresNadia N Sawicki (0000-0002-8307-3867, Chicago Kent College of Law, autor de correspondencia)
Año2016
Volumen38
Número3
Páginas211-233
Fecha de publicación2016-07-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaLaw & Policy (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0265-8240 • E-ISSN: 1467-9930
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/lapo.12059
OpenAlexW3121148737
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas2
Referencias citadas28

Policy makers frequently use arational appeals and nudges—such as those relying on emotion, cognitive biases, and subliminal messaging—to persuade citizens to adopt behaviors that support public goals. However, these communication tactics have been widely criticized for relying on arational triggers rather than reasoned argument. This article develops a fuller account of the nonconsequentialist objection to arational persuasion by state actors, focusing on theories of decisional autonomy and metadecisional voluntariness. The article concludes by proposing ethically justifiable limitations on state communications that should be compelling to both critics and advocates of arational persuasion

Argument (complex analysis · Autonomy · Law and economics · Nudge theory · Persuasion · Persuasive communication · Political science · Public relations · Sociology · State (computer science · Subliminal stimuli · Voluntariness · American Constitutional Law and Politics · Computer Science · Law · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology · Social and Intergroup Psychology · Social Psychology