Legal Reasoning and the Separation of Powers

This article investigates the influence of judicial decisions on state legislative oversight of federal funds. A systematic analysis of judicial decisions is undertaken in an effort to reveal (a) the extent to which such activity on the part of legislatures is permitted or denied by courts, and (b) the nature of legal reasoning that determines differential outcomes. The analysis reveals, among other things, that there are two divergent paths of law: one upholding the legislative prerogative to exercise the power of the purse, and the other upholding the executive function of governors to act as custodians and executors of federal funds and programs. The delegation of legislative powers to interim committees is likewise investigated

Delegation · Economics · Judicial review · Law and economics · Legislature · Political science · Politics · Prerogative · Separation of powers · State (computer science · American Constitutional Law and Politics · Law · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Legal and Constitutional Studies · Public Administration

• The courts and social policy

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• Congressional Government

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• Congress Oversees the Bureaucracy

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• Legislatures and Oversight

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• Consequences of Legislative Review of Agency Regulations in Three U. S. States

  Open Access•Marcus E Ethridge•Legislative Studies Quarterly•1984

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• U. S. State Legislative Committees

  Open Access•Wayne L Francis, Wayne Francis et al.•Legislative Studies Quarterly•1982

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• Holding Government Bureaucracies Accountable

  Open Access•Barry Bozeman, Bernard Rosen•Journal of Policy Analysis and…•1983

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• The American Legislative Process

  Gregory Field, G R Field et al.•The Western Political Quarterly•1964

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• Conflict or Constructive Tension

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• Bureaucracy in a Democracy

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• Casework as a Technique of U. S. Congressional Oversight of the Executive

  Open Access•John R Johannes•Legislative Studies Quarterly•1979

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• Factors Influencing the Adoption of New Methods of Legislative Oversight in the U. S. States

  Open Access•Keith E Hamm, Roby D Robertson•Legislative Studies Quarterly•1981

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• Conditions for Legislative Control

  Seymour Scher•The Journal of Politics•1963

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• Congress and the "Details" of Administration

  Allen Schick•Public Administration Review•1976

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• The Politics of Partnership

  R Shep Melnick•Public Administration Review•1985

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• Governors

  Open Access•Thad L Beyle, Scott Mouw•Policy Studies Journal•1989

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• Overseeing Oversight

  Open Access•Morris S Ogul, Bert A Rockman•Legislative Studies Quarterly•1990

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• Legislative-Executive Relations and Legislative Oversight

  Open Access•Bert A Rockman•Legislative Studies Quarterly•1984

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• The Utility of State Legislative Casework as a Means of Oversight

  Open Access•Richard C Elling•Legislative Studies Quarterly•1979

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• Legislative Behavior and Legislative Oversight

  Open Access•Alan Rosenthal•Legislative Studies Quarterly•1981

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• The "New Federalism" and Prisoners' Rights

  Open Access•Kenneth C Haas•The Western Political Quarterly•1981

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