Obraz polityki karnej lat osiemdziesiątych i początku lat dziewięćdziesiątych (1980‒1991)
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 6136675 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Jerzy Jasiński (Instytut Nauk Prawnych, autor de correspondencia), Jerzy Jasiński Jerzy Jasiński |
| Año | 1993 |
| Número | 19 |
| Páginas | 27-105 |
| Fecha de publicación | 1993-08-08 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Archiwum Kryminologii (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 2719-4280 • E-ISSN: 0066-6890 |
| Editorial | Polish Scientific Publishers PWN (PUBLISHER • PL) |
| DOI | 10.7420/ak1993c |
| OpenAlex | W3199296940 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 2 |
| Referencias citadas | 3 |
The paper is a continuation of the previous analyses of penal policy pursued by Polish courts. The directions and shape of penal policy are the resultant of many different elements. Analysed in the present paper is the impact on that policy of changes in: penal law; detected crime; and some characteristics of the population of convicted persons. The 1980s abounded in far-reaching changes of penal legislation. In the years 1980-1981, the tremendous “Solidarity” movement failed to bring about a penal law reform despite the fact that its representatives started intensive work toward that aim, preparing and stimulating others to prepare drafts of such reform. The imposition of martial law secured continued power to the communists; its social costs, however, were extremely high. An item on the bill society were forced to pay was the inclusion into penal law of many elements typical of the law of war which aggravated criminal responsibility. Thus (1) the competence of military courts was extended to various categories of civilians; (2) the application of special modes of procedure was introduced or extended, including the single-instance summary proceedings; (3) many statutory penalties were aggravated; (4) many different categories of acts were penalized which had not been punishable before, including in particular pursuit of trade union activities and organization of strikes and protests; (5) internment was introduced as an administrative form of preventive deprivation of liberty. The abrogation of martial law resulted in removal of most but not all of the above aggravations. A new tide of severe provisions came with the acts of May 1985 which in fact created a new “martial law” in penal law. It consisted in: (1) extension of applicability of the existing and introduction of new “simplified” modes of procedure which involved limitation of the defendant’s right to defence; (2) aggravation of the statutory penalties for many acts; (3) vast extension of the application of additional penalties; (4) limitation of the applicability of suspended sentences; (5) exclusion of conditional release of multiple recidivists; (6) extension of the conditions of withdrawal of parole. Therefore, penal policy was shifted twice towards aggravation in the 1980s, the first such shift was made in 1982 and continued with reduced force throughout 1983, and the second one taking place in the years 1985‒1988. Departure from the over-punitive penal law of People’s Republic of Poland started in 1989 with the emergence of the new political order which created the initial conditions for the building of the Third Republic. In 1989, just the first steps were made, followed by few farther in the years 1990‒1991, towards changing the contens of penal law and reforming the most glaring effects of its abuse. Such steps met with immense difficulties. The attachment to former penal law proved strong: to penal law with indefinite statutory features of situences, with severe penalties which could be accumulated and imposed in the conditions of far-reaching limitation of the right to defence or even by default. According to an opinion often expressed in official statements, penal policy was to be determined first and foremost by the state of crime. The extent and trends of crime in general and of the separate offences were to “force” the authorities accordingly to shape penal policy. The incessantly growing threat to public order and citizens’ safety, and to social property in particular, was to justify the need for aggravated and accumulated penalties. Also penal lawyers who noticed the direct relationship between crime and punishment tended ‒ and still tend today for that matter ‒ to suppose that an identical relationship can be found between crime as a mass phenomenon and punishment as a proces of distribution of condemnations through the imposition of penalties by courts. Yet whatever the relations between punishment ‒ its severity in particular ‒ and crime, they are in fact very weak indeed. This is shown by facts: crime comparable as to extent and gravity meets with most different punishment in different countries. A growth in crime sometimes leaves penal policy unchanged, and at other times results in its aggravation or mitigation; similar are the effects of a decrease in crime. Poland is a good example here: in the 1970s, detected crime was on the decrease but penal policy gained in strictness; in the 1980s, crime went up and the aggravation of penal policy continued. In the first of those decades, the decrease in crime was said to have resulted from the particular shape of penal policy pursued then; in the next one, the need forstrict penal policy was argued to follow from the growth in crime. Never mentioned, instead, was a trend of crime which would actually justify a mitigation of penal policy. As we know, the extent and also largely the structure of detected crime, that is of crime recorded by the police, is the resultant of many different organizational, legal, and often also political factors. The real extent and structure of crime can hardly be seen through that screen, and its picture is often distorted. In the former “socialist” states, the extent of crime was a political issue: generally speaking, it shaped the way the authorities expected it to shape. During the 1970s and even in 1980, the number of detected offences ‒ those confirmed in preparatory proceedings ‒ was 320‒350 thousand a year. Starting from 1981, it went up rapidly to 540 thousand in 1984. For the next few years, it was falsely kept at a similar or even somewhat lower level which was to manifest the effectiveness of the drastic statutes of May 1985. Early in the 1990s, the situation was changed radically: the extent of detected crime was no longer perceived as a political issue regulated as the authorities requested. In the years 1990‒1992, the number of detected offences became stabilized at 860‒880 thousand a year. It is believed to have actually gone up, and it no doubt did go up in the economy-related spheres: the real number of offences against foreign currency and customs regulations, tax offences, frauds, embezzlements etc. was indeed greater. III. The above-mentioned growth in the number of detected offences was hardly reflected in the numer of persons found guilty in criminal proceedings. There were about 200 thousand such persons a year, and the numer only went down in years when amnesty laws were passed. Penal legislation provides for different penalties for the separate offences. Therefore, in order to appraise the enhanced or reduced severity of penal policy, it is important to investigate any possible changes in the proportions of those offences throughout the 1980s. In the years 1980‒1991, convictions for crimes (where the statutory penalty is deprivation of liberty for at least 3 years) regularly amounted to 3‒4%, and those for the more serious offences (statutory pelalty of at least 1 or 2 years imprisonment) – to 19‒31%. In the early half of the 1980s, there was a shift towalds a greater proportion of convictions for the less serious offences. The opposite trend could be noticed in the latter half of the decade. Generally speaking, the bulk of convicted persons were guilty of less and less serious offences during the discussed decade, the proportion of convictions for serious crimes remaining rather stable in that period. This trend could be noticed under the statutes of May 1985 which shows how unrelated they were to the real situation in the sphere of crime, and how much they depended on other factors such as e.g. the ruling elites’ desire to have their revenge on society for the events of 1980-1981. The situation changed in the years 1989‒1991 when the proportion of persons convicted for the more serious offences started to go up rapidly. This sole element considered – that is, the structure of crime – were penal policy stable throughout the years l980‒1988, there should have been more and more sentences to penalties not involving deprivation of liberty, and the length of inprisonment should have been reduced. In the years 1989‒1991, instead, a greater number of longer immediate prison sentences could be expected. The most severe, of all penalties provided for by Polish law is capitol puishment. In the years 1981‒1982, there were 3‒4 valid sentences to that pe- nalty a year, the number going up to a dozen or so in the years 1984‒1986. The common courts imposed death penalty for homicide only. Since 1988, not a single valid sentence to death has been imposed by those courts (though it was imposed by invalid sentences in isolated cases). This de facts abolition can be hoped to persist, especially as the new draft penal code does not provide for capital punishment. The death penalty has first of all a symbolic sense; it is difficult to say why the authorities insisted on rejecting all the postulates for its abolition. Instead, the basic instrument that determines the punitiveness of the Polish penal system is unconditional deprivation of liberty. Penal policy of the 1970s had few good points; one of them was a limitation of the use of that penalty, noticeable at the end of the decade. This trend was further intensified in 1981 when 19% of those found guilty were sentenced to immediate imprisonment. Under martial law and in the period of its suspension, there was a slight shift away from that policy (2l‒22%). It was finally abandoned in the years 1984‒1986: in 1986, 30% of those found guilty were sentenced to immediate inprisonment. In 1988, the policy-makers came back to their senses, and re-orientation of penal policy was started: sentenced to immediate imprisonment were 21% of those found guilty. This proportion went further down to 18% in 1989, but then proceeded to rise again in the years 1990‒1991 (19‒20%). The above-mentioned change in the structure of crime in those years considered, this fact cannot possibly be seen as
Criminology · Political science · European and International Law Studies · European Criminal Justice and Data Protection · Historical and Contemporary Political Dynamics · History · Psychology
| Obras citantes distintas | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 0,07 |
| Intervalo de citas | 1996 - 2019 (24) |
| Velocidad de citación | historical |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 2 |