The Politics of Executive Nominations in the Post-Nuclear Senate

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6182829
AutoresIan Ostrander (0000-0001-5248-1780, Michigan State University, autor de correspondencia)
Año2017
Volumen44
Número3
Páginas323-343
Fecha de publicación2017-09-02
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaCongress & the Presidency (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0734-3469 • E-ISSN: 1944-1053
EditorialInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/07343469.2017.1354943
OpenAlexW2757404115
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas7
Referencias citadas22

In response to an ever more inefficient, intrusive, partisan, and plodding executive nominations process, a variety of increasingly potent reform measures have been recently enacted within Congress. The solutions have ranged from cutting the number of appointments requiring Senate confirmation to reducing the power of the filibuster on most nominations. Although these reforms may speed the nominations process, they may also influence the balance of power between Congress and the presidency by allowing more unilateral and unrestricted appointments. Is Congress conceding confirmation for expediency? In this investigation, I explore recent reforms with respect to the speed and outcomes of the executive nominations process as well as the balance of power between the executive and legislative branches

Balance (ability · Executive branch · Executive power · Law and economics · Legislative process · Legislature · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Presidency · Process (computing · Sociology · Variety (cybernetics · American Constitutional Law and Politics · Computer Science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Neuroscience · Psychology · Public Administration