Pragmatism, Experience, and the Given

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6190886
AutoresScott F Aikin (0000-0002-5358-7234, WKU Glasgow Regional Center, 500 Hilltopper Way, Glasgow, KY 42141-7966 USA, autor de correspondencia), Scott Aikin
Año2009
Volumen19
Número1
Páginas19-27
Fecha de publicación2009-06-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaHuman Affairs (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 1210-3055 • E-ISSN: 1337-401X
EditorialWalter de Gruyter GmbH (PUBLISHER • DE)
DOI10.2478/v10023-009-0016-x
OpenAlexW2012306805
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas5
Referencias citadas20

Pragmatism, Experience, and the Given The doctrine of the Given is that subjects have direct non-inferential awareness of content of their experiences and apprehensions, and that some of a subject's beliefs are justified on the basis of that subject's awareness of her experiences and apprehensions. Pragmatist criticisms of the Given as a myth are shown here not only to be inadequate but to presuppose the Given. A model for a pragmatist account of the Given is then provided in terms of refinements of Dewey's theory of experience. The doctrine of the Given is implicated in the functions of inquiry insofar as one must take it that experience is a source of justification

Doctrine · Epistemology · Mythology · Pragmatism · Sociology · Theology · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Philosophy · Pragmatism in Philosophy and Education · Psychology · Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications