Equity and the distribution of rewards
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 6203333 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Irving M Lane, Lawrence A Messé |
| Año | 1971 |
| Volumen | 20 |
| Número | 1 |
| Páginas | 1-17 |
| Fecha de publicación | 1971-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | No |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0022-3514 • E-ISSN: 1939-1315 |
| Editorial | American Psychological Association (APA) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1037/h0031684 |
| OpenAlex | W1518971399 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 25 |
The paper reports the results of two studies which examined propositions derived from equity theory concerning how persons distribute rewards to themselves and others. Such behavior can be classified into three types of distribution responses. Study 1 investigated the distribution responses of persons who each had unilateral power to determine their own rewards and those of one other person, when both had equal inputs. Results supported predictions generated from equity theory concerning the relative frequencies of distribution responses. Also, a number of situational and personal variables were found to affect responses. In Study 2, subjects distributed rewards in one of four groups constituted such that differences in the input levels of the chooser and his co-worker were systemically varied. Results only partially supported equity theory since only the inputs of the co-worker affected choices. Taken together, the results of both studies indicate that persons do conform to a norm of equity which lessens the potential for conflict present in all social situations. (Author)
Affect (linguistics) · Distribution (mathematics) · Economics · Equity (law) · Equity theory · Microeconomics · Political science · Situational ethics · Communication · Conflict Management and Negotiation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Mathematics · Psychology · Social Power and Status Dynamics · Social Psychology
Why Justice? Normative and Instrumental Interpretations11This chapter was prepared while the senior author was in residence as a Fulbright research scholar at the Université Catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium. We acknowledge the support of that institution and the Commission for Educational Exchange between the United States of America, Belgium, and Luxemburg.
Equity and Social Exchange11The senior author would like to thank the London School of Economics for providing an appropriate intellectual environment for the initial phase of this effort, and NSF (NSF Grant 77-03862) and the University Faculty Research Committee for financial assistance during the preparation of this chapter.
Effects of Conformity Pressure on Justice Behavior11This chapter was written while the author was a fellow at the Institute for Advanced Study in the Humanities and Social Sciences, The Netherlands.
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| Obras citantes distintas | 25 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 0,47 |
| Intervalo de citas | 1973 - 2026 (54) |
| Velocidad de citación | current |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 25 |