Political Decentralization and Inflation

Sub-National Evidence from China

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6227135
AutoresYasheng Huang (0000-0003-0183-6312, Massachusetts Institute of Technology), Yumin Sheng (0000-0002-9870-8896, Wayne State University)
Año2009
Volumen39
Número2
Páginas389-412
Fecha de publicación2009-04-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaBritish Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0007-1234 • E-ISSN: 1469-2112
EditorialCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0007123408000549
OpenAlexW2108919953
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas13

One possible political determinant of macroeconomic instability scholars have explored at length is decentralization, but cross-national research measuring political decentralization in terms of constitutional federalism has produced mixed evidence regarding its effects on inflation. Conceptualizing political decentralization in terms of governing political party decentralization but acknowledging the challenges of cross-national data collection, the authors suggest the utility of a sub-national approach by studying one country under single-party rule. Drawing on provincial-level cross-section time-series data, they find that political decentralization measured as the inverse of central government political control, via the ruling party, over the different provincial governments is positively correlated with provincial inflation in China during 1978–97. The finding is robust to alternative specifications, expanded year coverage and Granger causality tests

Causality (physics · China · Decentralization · Economic system · Economics · Federalism · Government (linguistics · Inflation (cosmology · Market economy · Political economy · Political instability · Political science · Politics · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Public Administration