Regime Change in Presidential and Congressional Budgeting

Role Discontinuity or Role Evolution

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6231035
AutoresJames Cox, Gregory L Hager, Gregory Hager, David Lowery (0000-0002-6267-9712)
Año1993
Volumen37
Número1
Páginas88
Fecha de publicación1993-02-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaAmerican Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907
EditorialJSTOR (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/2111525
OpenAlexW2334371758
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas6
Referencias citadas17

The abandonment of the budgetary role theory of Fenno (1966) and Wildavsky (1964) in the wake of budgetary developments since 1970 has come at great cost. That is, we now lack a viable microlevel theory of budgeting with which to interpret our increasingly sophisticated models of aggregate budget outcomes. We attempt to reformulate budget role theory so that it can account for changes in institutional advocacy and guardianship over the course of the full post-World War II period by substituting for the assumption that roles are temporally stable the hypothesis that roles develop in a systemic and evolutionary fashion. We develop and test several substantive explanations of the gradual evolution of budgetary roles with data on the surviving 22 agencies used by Fenno in The Power of the Purse. We find that patterns of split party control of government may influence greatly the development of budget roles. The findings are discussed in terms of their implications for the further development of the political theory of the budgetary process

Abandonment (legal · Economics · Government (linguistics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Presidential system · Punctuated equilibrium · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Public Policy and Administration Research