Tradition and Prudence in Locke's Exceptions to Toleration

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6232080
AutoresDavid J Lorenzo (0000-0001-6107-0342, autor de correspondencia)
Año2003
Volumen47
Número2
Páginas248-258
Fecha de publicación2003-04-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaAmerican Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/1540-5907.00017
OpenAlexW2022159844
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas3
Referencias citadas17

Why did Locke exclude Catholics and atheists from toleration? Not, I contend, because he was trapped by his context, but because his prudential approach and practical judgments led him to traditional texts. I make this argument first by outlining the connections among prudential exceptionality, practical judgments, and traditional texts. I then describe important continuities between conventional English understandings of the relationship between state and religion and Locke's writings on toleration, discuss Locke's conception of rights, and illustrate his use of prudential exceptions and distinctions. I conclude by arguing that Locke's problems are relevant to assessing contemporary liberal discussions of toleration and the separation of state and religion that lean heavily on practical justifications

Argument (complex analysis · Context (archaeology · Epistemology · Law and economics · Political science · Politics · Prudence · Sociology · State (computer science · Toleration · American Constitutional Law and Politics · History · Law · Mathematics · Philosophy · Political Theory and Influence · Religion, Gender, and Enlightenment