Does the longer tenure of local government heads affect the performance of local governments? The Korean case

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6233728
AutoresHeejin Han (0000-0002-5519-2236, Pukyong National University, autor de correspondencia), Kilkon Ko (0000-0001-9859-2080, Seoul National University), Sue Yeon Cho (Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission, The Korean Government)
Año2019
Volumen27
Número1
Páginas127-144
Fecha de publicación2019-01-02
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaAsian Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0218-5377 • E-ISSN: 1750-7812
EditorialInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/02185377.2019.1598451
OpenAlexW2924712260
IdiomaEN
Referencias citadas34

The relationship between the length of tenure of elected heads of local governments (HOLG) and performance of local governments remains ambiguous, with few empirical studies on it. Korea presents a compelling case in that it has limited HOLG to serve only three consecutive terms based on the untested belief that longer tenures have a negative effect on local governments. To address these gaps, this study applies the fixed effect panel model, using the Korean government data from 2008 to 2014. Our findings reveal a negative relationship between tenure length and efficiency, particularly among local governments demonstrating a low level of efficiency. The relationship between the length of tenure and integrity is also negative, especially among local governments with low levels of integrity. However, given that these relationships disappear when factors specific to local governments are controlled, our findings should be interpreted cautiously

Affect (linguistics · Business · Government (linguistics · Linguistics · Local government · Political science · Corporate Taxation and Avoidance · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Psychology · Public Administration