Two Value-pluralist Arguments for Liberalism

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6235086
AutoresGeorge Crowder (0000-0002-9332-9416, autor de correspondencia)
Año2002
Volumen37
Número3
Páginas457-473
Fecha de publicación2002-11-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaAustralian Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 1036-1146 • E-ISSN: 1363-030X
EditorialInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/1036114021000026355
OpenAlexW2073031426
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas3
Referencias citadas48

John Gray has argued that Berlinian value pluralism undermines the traditional claims of liberalism to universal authority, rendering it at best no more than one legitimate political form among others. That view is mistaken; value pluralism implies a distinctive case for liberalism as a universal project by way of two principal lines of argument. First, pluralism implies the desirability within a given political arena of a diversity of goods and ways of life, a diversity best accommodated by liberalism. Second, the rational resolution of particular cases of value conflict under pluralism is possible (where it is possible) only by way of a particularist, Aristotelian form of practical reasoning, which requires the exercise of certain characteristically liberal virtues. Overall, pluralism not only supports liberalism, but supports liberalism in a strong, universalist and perfectionist form

Classical liberalism · Economics · Epistemology · Law and economics · Liberalism · Pluralism (philosophy · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Sociology · Value (mathematics · Value pluralism · Hannah Arendt's Political Philosophy · Law · Mathematics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics