The godfather provides

Enduring corruption and organizational hierarchy in the Kenyan police service

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6264635
AutoresNjoroge Mutahi, Makena Micheni (0000-0002-5892-7322, London School of Economics London UK, autor de correspondencia), Milli Lake (0000-0002-5915-7374, London School of Economics London UK)
Año2023
Volumen36
Número2
Páginas401-419
Fecha de publicación2023-04-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaGovernance (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0952-1895 • E-ISSN: 1468-0491
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/gove.12672
OpenAlexW4210800144
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas11
Referencias citadas45

Despite government commitments to mitigate corruption and strengthen mechanisms of accountability in state security sectors, reform efforts frequently fail to curb illegal practices by state agents. Scholars offer explanations that range from deeply embedded societal norms of appropriate behavior to rational accounts emphasizing the individualized benefits corruption can offer. Using a case study of the Service Standing Orders in Kenya's National Police Service however, we build on the work of Persson et al.'s analysis to show how corrupt practices on the part of street‐level agents are reinforced within organizational hierarchies, through institutionalized—rather than personalized—incentives and obligations. As a result, policy innovations that do not explicitly identify the countervailing incentives created through internal command structures are likely to miss potentially fruitful avenues for institutional reform

Accountability · Business · Economics · Government (linguistics · Hierarchy · Incentive · Language change · Law and economics · Market economy · Political science · Public relations · Service (business · State (computer science · Work (physics · Corruption and Economic Development · Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Public Administration · Marketing