New Democracies and Commitment to Human Rights Treaties

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6273136
AutoresX Dai (0000-0002-7318-6219, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign), Alexandros Tokhi (0000-0003-1854-9686, Goethe University Frankfurt)
Año2023
Volumen67
Número4
Fecha de publicación2023-09-11
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaInternational Studies Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0020-8833 • E-ISSN: 1468-2478
EditorialOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/isq/sqad092
OpenAlexW4388427201
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas6
Referencias citadas68

One of the most influential arguments suggests that new democracies are more inclined than others to commit to international human rights treaties. This paper examines whether new democracies are more likely to commit not only to the basic, but also to the more demanding and constraining treaties. We argue that despite the strategic utility of costly commitments, new democracies are often unwilling to pay for the increased costs of more demanding and constraining treaties. We test our argument by tackling some of the trickiest inferential challenges. We employ propensity score weighting to address the nonrandom assignment of new democracies and further specify marginal structural models to account for dynamic confounding. Our analyses reveal intriguing findings. While new democracies commit to the broad human rights conventions more quickly, they are more reluctant than established democracies to commit to the more demanding and constraining protocols

Argument (complex analysis · Biology · Commit · Economics · Human rights · Law and economics · Political science · Computer Science · Human Rights and Development · International Development and Aid · Law · Political Conflict and Governance