Incomplete Contracting, Commission Discretion and the Origins of EU Merger Control
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 6281028 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Thomas Doleys, Thomas J Doleys (0000-0003-3225-1069, Kennesaw State University, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2009 |
| Volumen | 47 |
| Número | 3 |
| Páginas | 483-506 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2009-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0021-9886 • E-ISSN: 1468-5965 |
| Editorial | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1468-5965.2009.01813.x |
| OpenAlex | W2089537092 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 4 |
| Referencias citadas | 37 |
Council Regulation 4064/89 on the Control of Concentration between Undertakings– more commonly known as the Merger Regulation – was a watershed development in the evolution of the EU's competition policy regime. In this article we seek to cast new analytical light on what, in many respects, is an established narrative. To do this we draw on insights from the new institutional economics (NIE). Specifically, we draw on the complementary concepts of incomplete contracting and delegation. We demonstrate how the Commission utilized the discretion attendant to its delegated authority to interpret and apply the indeterminate language of treaty competition articles so as to alter the economic, political and legal environment as it pertained to merger activity. It did so to such an extent that Member States, long resistant to Commission proposals for a merger control regulation, came to regard legislative action as preferable to the uncertainty represented by the evolving status quo
Business · Commission · Competition (biology · Control (management · Delegation · Discretion · Economics · Law and economics · Legislature · Management · Merger control · Political science · Politics · Status quo · Treaty · Economic Theory and Institutions · European and International Law Studies · Law · Merger and Competition Analysis · Public Administration
Delegation and Agency in International Organizations
The Political Economy of Public Administration
Governing with Judges
The Engines of European Integration
Deliberate Discretion?
Political Institutions
Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process
Theory of the firm
After Hegemony
Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance
Institutions and Policy Change in the European Communities
Hierarchy Amidst Anarchy
The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets
Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm
Merger in daylight
Britain, Germany, and 1992
The Nature of the Firm
Member states and the European Commission
Preferences and Power in the European Community
Delegation, agency, and agenda setting in the European Community
Perceptions and alliances in Europe, 1865–1940
Negotiating the Single European Act
Legislative Procedures in the European Community
Theory and Practice of Delegation to Non-Majoritarian Institutions
Delegation to Supranational Institutions
An institutional critique of intergovernmentalism
Anarchy, hierarchy, and the variety of international relations
International institutions and the new economics of organization
Two Logics of Delegation
The New Economics of Organization
Ideas and Foreign Policy
Relational Exchange
| Obras citantes distintas | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 0,29 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2012 - 2026 (15) |
| Velocidad de citación | current |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 4 |